Rather, the non-moving party is required to submit evidence of specific facts by way of affidavits ( see Fed.R.Civ.P. The non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Moreover, "once the moving party has met his burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with some evidence beyond the mere allegations contained in the pleadings to show there is a genuine issue for trial." Baber v. If defendant carries this burden, "the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with facts sufficient to create a triable issue of fact." Id. In this case, defendant "bears the initial burden of pointing to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Temkin v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. "Genuineness means that the evidence must create fair doubt wholly speculative assertions will not suffice." Ross v. To the contrary, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Id. This does not mean that summary judgment is never appropriate in these cases. Courts take special care when considering summary judgment in employment discrimination cases because states of mind and motives are often crucial issues. The facts and inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. When no genuine issue of any material fact exists, summary judgment is appropriate.
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Defendants filed a reply on January 26, 2007. Johnson filed a memorandum in opposition to summary judgment on January 16, 2007.
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On December 27, 2006, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Thus, the remaining claims are only against Dillard's and Hartline. In her memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, Johnson states that she voluntarily dismissed Rhoads as a defendant following discovery. Because this is a dispositive motion, this report and recommendation is entered for review by the court.
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Pretrial matters in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), DSC. On December 22, 2006, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to all claims against Rhoads in his individual capacity and as to the tortious interference claim with contract claim against Hartline in his individual capacity. In addition, Johnson alleges claims under South Carolina law. She alleges claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Johnson filed an amended complaint on May 3, 2006. This action was stayed (until November 9, 2005) during the pendency of the arbitration action. Prior to filing this action, Dillard's filed an action seeking to compel Johnson to arbitrate her claims.
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("Dillard's"), Mike Hartline ("Hartline"), and Chuck Rhoads ("Rhoads"), removed this action to this court on October 29, 2003. Plaintiff, Arlene Johnson ("Johnson") filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina on October 1, 2003.